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FREEDOM TO EXCLUDE AFTER BOY SCOUTS
OF AMERICA V. DALE: DO PRIVATE
SCHOOLS HAVE A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE
AGAINST HOMOSEXUAL TEACHERS?
Karen Lim*
INTRODUCTION

Jim Doe was a teacher at Baden-Powell Academy, a secular private
boys' school.' The school's mission is to instill values in its students
and "prepare [them] to make ethical choices over their lifetimes" in
achieving their full potential.2 The values the school seeks to instill
include those of being "morally straight" and "clean."3 The school
defines "morally straight" as being "a person of strong character
[who] respect[s] and defend[s] the rights of all people." 4 "Clean"
refers to cleanliness in "body and mind." 5 It encompasses refraining
from mouthing "racial slurs and jokes that make fun of ethnic groups
or people with physical or mental limitations." 6

* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to my family for
their support, in particular David, Emma, and my mother. Thanks also to Professors
Tracy Higgins and Abner Greene for their advice.
1. The following hypothetical closely parallels the facts in Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), but reframes the issues in two key ways. First, it sets the
right to freedom of expressive association, on which the Boy Scouts of America ("Boy
Scouts") prevailed in Dale, directly against the firmly established civil rights
proscription against invidious discrimination in employment. Second, it shifts the
forum from a voluntary organization that instills values in its young members to a
formal school environment, inviting consideration of the issues in light of the
Supreme Court's previous decisions regarding the First Amendment in the specific
context of education.
2. Boy Scouts of America, Mission Statement, at http://www.scouting.org/media/
values/newsletter/0102/mission.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003); see also Dale, 530 U.S.
at 666 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting mission statement of Boy Scouts of America).
3. Boy Scouts of America, Boy Scout Handbook 9 (11th ed. 1998) (listing
qualities in Scout Oath and Scout Law) [hereinafter BSA, Scout Handbook]; see also
Dale, 530 U.S. at 667 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4. BSA, Scout Handbook, supra note 3, at 46; see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 667
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
5. BSA, Scout Handbook, supra note 3, at 53; see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 667
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
6. BSA, Scout Handbook, supra note 3, at 53; see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 668
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Doe taught at Baden-Powell for twelve years, and his work was
recognized by several awards for excellence in teaching. Two years
ago, Doe acknowledged that he was gay and joined the Gay and
Lesbian Organization in his city. He became co-president of the
organization and was interviewed by the local paper on his views
regarding the organization's role in the community. Doe had never
expressed views on homosexuality to his students, nor was he
responsible for teaching any sex education classes at Baden-Powell.
Baden-Powell's sex education curriculum did not include any
instruction on homosexuality. Soon after the interview appeared in
the paper, however, Baden-Powell dismissed Doe. When Doe
inquired about the reason for his dismissal, the school principal
informed him that it was the school's policy not to employ openly gay
teachers.
Doe filed a complaint against Baden-Powell in state court, alleging
that the school violated the state's employment discrimination law
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Baden-Powell responded that its action was constitutionally protected
under the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expressive
association. The state's anti-discrimination law cannot compel the
school to continue to employ an openly homosexual teacher because
it never had conveyed, and now declines to convey, a message that
homosexuality is legitimate.
The above hypothetical demonstrates a longstanding conflict
between two constitutional principles: the right to free speech, and the
corresponding freedom to associate for the purpose of expressing a
message; and the right to equality, and its correlative guarantee of
freedom from discrimination.7 The hypothetical places this conflict
within another debate: whether parental or state interests should
prevail with regard to the education of children.'
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the conflict between
freedom of association and anti-discrimination laws in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that freedom of
association protected the right of the Boy Scouts of America ("Boy

7. See Neal Troum, Expressive Association and the Right to Exclude: Reading
Between the Lines in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 641, 642
(2002).
8. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the state
may not prevent Amish parents from taking their children out of school before they
reach the age of sixteen): Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that
the state may not ban private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(holding that the state may not proscribe teaching of languages other than English
below the eighth grade): Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist
Manifesto, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 937 (1996) (offering defense of parental educational
authority); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce
and the Child as Property, 33 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992) (arguing against
parental educational authority).
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Scouts") to revoke the membership of an openly gay scoutmaster. 9
The Court ruled that the Boy Scouts is an expressive association
because its mission of instilling values in young people constitutes
expressive activity;"' that the inclusion of James Dale, an openly gay
scoutmaster, would force the Boy Scouts to send a message to its
members and to the world that it condones homosexual behavior;"
and that New Jersey's anti-discriminatory public accommodations law
requiring the Boy Scouts to re-admit Dale violated the Boy Scouts'
right of expressive association.12 The Court's decision implicated
parental and state interests in education, although the Court did not
explicitly mention these interests. 3 The majority's holding affirms the
right of parents to direct the education of their children.' 4
In the two years since the Court decided Dale, many commentators
have speculated on the reach of the holding. One First Amendment
advocate has celebrated the decision as heralding stringent scrutiny of
anti-discrimination laws when they conflict with First Amendment
rights. 5 This commentator opines that "Dale was about the right of
non-profit, private, expressive organizations of all ideological
stripes ...

to set their membership and employment rules free from

government interference. '"6 Another commentator, asserting that
Dale "calls for the constitutional invalidation of much of the Civil
Rights Act, including Title VII insofar as it relates to employment,"
predicts that Dale will have an even more extreme impact on antidiscrimination laws. 7
In contrast, a civil rights advocate deplores the decision for
imperiling anti-discrimination laws, worrying that landlords and
employers can shield themselves from housing and employment laws
simply by "assert[ing] that a gay man's or lesbian's mere presence

9. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644. Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion,
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
10. See id. at 649-50.
11. See id. at 653.
12. See id. at 656.
13. See Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the
Expression of Associations, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1841, 1856-61 (2001) (drawing
relationship between educative function of associations and state regulation of
schools); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 Minn. L. Rev.
1917, 1953-54 (2001) (arguing that three cases decided in the Supreme Court's 1999
term, including Dale, call for reassessment of the Court's decisions involving the
state's ability to police private schools); Troum, supra note 7, at 688-90 (positing that
Boy Scouts' role in educating the young was essential factor in the majority's
holding).
14. See Paulsen, supra note 13, at 1953; Troum, supra note 7, at 689-90.
15. See David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66
Mo. L. Rev. 83, 89 (2001).
16. Id. at 88.
17. Richard A. Epstein, The ConstitutionalPerils of Moderation: The Case of the
Boy Scouts, 74 S.Cal. L. Rev. 119, 142 (2000).
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violates their beliefs."'"
Other commentators, taking a more
moderate view, maintain that Dale's holding is narrowly
circumscribed. 9 One such commentator nevertheless contends that
the freedom of expressive association protects the employment
decisions of private schools in their choice of instructors." In other
words, even if Dale were construed narrowly, Jim Doe has no legal
recourse against Baden-Powell for discriminatory dismissal.
This Note questions the conclusion that Dale necessitates the defeat
of Doe's employment discrimination claim.
Part I.A gives an
overview of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the freedom
of association, and Part I.B outlines the development of antidiscrimination laws, with particular attention paid to employment
discrimination legislation. Next, Part I.C examines seminal cases in
which the Court adjudicated claims of free association against claims
of discrimination.
This examination reveals that where the
exclusionary practices of expressive associations have stifled the
economic interests of disadvantaged groups protected by antidiscrimination laws, the Court has consistently upheld the
discrimination claims. Finally, Part 1.D delineates the debate over
free association and anti-discrimination laws provoked by Dale, and
lays out the major ideological arguments presented by opponents and
supporters of the majority's decision.
Part II focuses on two facets of the Dale debate that are particularly
relevant to the Baden-Powell hypothetical. First, Part II.A details the
solution Dale Carpenter offers to balance the conflicting mandates of
free expression and anti-discrimination, which is to classify
associations as being commercial, expressive, or quasi-expressive.
Under this tripartite analysis, Carpenter argues that private schools
are quasi-expressive associations and that Dale rightly protects a
private school's choice of teachers from interference by the state.
Second, Part I1.B outlines conflicting views on the relative interests of
parents, the state, and the child with regard to the education of
children. One view advocates the right of parents to direct the
education of their children; the other promotes a trusteeship model of
parental rights, suggesting that with regard to decisions on education,
the child's, rather than the parent's, interests should come first.
18. Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model,
85 Minn. L. Rev. 1591, 1603 (2001).
19. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law
After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1515, 1515-18, 1563-80 (2001)
(proposing to reconcile claims for associational freedom and equality by varying
constitutional protection for organizations based on whether they are commercial,
expressive, or quasi-expressive); Troum, supra note 7, at 679-90 (positing that Dale's
holding is limited by three factors: (1) whether the organization engages in
commercial or non-commercial expression; (2) the class of persons the organization
seeks to exclude; and (3) whether the organization participates in childrearing).
20. See Carpenter, supra note 19, at 1577; infra Part II.A.
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Part III analyzes the facts of the Baden-Powell hypothetical using
the Court's framework in Dale, and contends that Dale's demanding
standard nevertheless allows for a more nuanced review of the issues
than the above-mentioned commentators imply. This Note concludes
that a state's interest in enforcing employment discrimination laws
should be upheld against Baden-Powell's expressive association
claims.
Furthermore, a state's interest in regulating education,
together with the child's right to participate in the marketplace of
ideas, should prevail over parental interests in directing the education
of children.
I. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CONFLICT

The furor over Dale centers on two cherished civil liberties:
freedom of association and freedom from discrimination.2' In a
democracy, freedom to associate is an important civil liberty, because
associations provide individual citizens with a means to exert their
collective political will to keep government in check.22 The right to be
free from discrimination is underpinned by the guarantee of "equal
protection of the laws"23 which is a fundamental principle of our
society.24 Freedom to associate, however, "presupposes a freedom not
to associate."25 In other words, a necessary cognate of the freedom to
associate is the freedom to discriminate. Therefore, freedom of
association and freedom from discrimination are irreconcilably
opposed to each other.2 6
This part provides an overview of these opposing rights. Section A
reviews the development of the Supreme Court's freedom of
association jurisprudence. Section B chronicles the enactment of antidiscrimination legislation, with emphasis on the passage of
employment discrimination laws. Section C discusses seminal cases in
which the Court addressed the conflict between free association and
anti-discrimination claims. Section D outlines the critical reactions to
the Court's decision in Dale.
A. The Supreme Court's Freedom of Association Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court first explicitly recognized a right of freedom of
27 In this civil
association in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22. See Garnett,supra note 13, at 1853.
23. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. See House Judiciary Comm., Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, H.R.
Rep. No. 88-914, at 18 (1963), reprinted in United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act
of 1964, at 2018 (1968) [hereinafter Legislative History of Titles VII and XI].
25. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
26. See Epstein, supra note 17, at 119-20.
27. 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); Jason Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, 77 Wash. L.
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rights era case, the Court reviewed an Alabama statute that required
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
("NAACP") to disclose the names of its Alabama members to the
state.25 Among its activities in Alabama, the NAACP had given
financial and legal support to black students who sought to enter the
state university, and had supported black citizens in boycotting bus
lines in the hope of forcing desegregation in bus seating.29 The Court
held that the statute violated the right of the NAACP's members to
freely associate in the pursuit of lawful interests, a First Amendment
liberty guaranteed to private citizens against the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment.3 "
The Patterson Court acknowledged that the Constitution does not
specifically mandate freedom of association, but rather that the right
derives from the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and
assembly.3" Relying on the Court's previous pronouncements that
free speech and free assembly are closely linked because group
expression contributes to the advocacy of private and public
viewpoints, the Patterson Court declared that "freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech."32
Further, any state action which infringes on free association must be
closely scrutinized.3 3
Consequently, the Court upheld freedom of association as a
constitutional shield protecting from coercive state action the lawful
collective efforts of individual citizens to effect political and social
change.34 Members of dissident organizations in particular benefited
from this constitutional shelter. 5 In Patterson's precursors and
progeny, the right has protected Communists, white supremacists, and
flag burners from state suppression."
Rev. 639, 649 (2002).
28. See Patterson,357 U.S. at 451.
29. See id. at 452.
30. Id. at 466.
31. Id. at 460.
32. Id. (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 460-61.
34. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609. 622 (1984) (summarizing
the Court's free association jurisprudence since Patterson).
35. See id. (explaining that the right of free association is "especially important in
preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from
suppression by the majority"). For a history of how the First Amendment has
protected dissident speech, and an argument that the Court's leading free speech
cases are really about state intrusion on the freedom of expressive association, see
Carpenter, supra note 19, at 1519-25.
36. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 406 (1989) (holding that burning
of the American flag to protest the renomination of Ronald Reagan as a presidential
candidate was symbolic political speech protected by the First Amendment);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-49 (1969) (holding that an Ohio statute
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Patterson established that state action offensive to freedom of
association could take the form of either direct or indirect action." A
state could directly violate free association by bringing criminal
charges against a disfavored organization's members, or by seeking to
enjoin the production of publications accusing public officials of
corruption." State action that indirectly infringes free association
does not purport to target the organization's activities or membership,
but nevertheless has the incidental effect of impairing an
organization's ability to continue its operations." In Patterson, for
example, compelled disclosure of the NAACP's membership lists
would have unleashed harmful private activity against the
organization's members in the form of economic reprisals and physical
threats, resulting in a loss of membership to the organization and
curtailment of its activities.4 A state also could indirectly violate free
association by compelling the organization to admit unwelcome
members, thus indirectly causing a change in the organization's
agenda. 41 Only if an organization's advocacy was "directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and ... [was] likely to incite or

produce such action" would the state be permitted to regulate the
organization.42
The Court regarded the wide latitude accorded associations as
necessary to prevent social and political upheaval.4 3 As the Court
emphasized, the "security of the Republic, the very foundation of
constitutional government," depended on keeping the channels of
communication open between the people and government.44 Desired
changes could only be achieved through government responding to
the will of the people.45

criminalizing voluntary assembly of group to advocate unlawful action violated Ku
Klux Klan leader's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights); De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937) (holding that Oregon's Criminal Syndicalism Law violated
due process rights of a plaintiff who assisted in the conduct of a Communist Party
meeting).
37. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 461. For an extended discussion of the types of state
action which may violate freedom of association, see Mazzone, supra note 27, at 65153.
38. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 461 (citing De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 353; Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)); see also Near, 283 U.S. at 722-23 (striking down
Minnesota statute providing for injunction against defamatory publications); supra
note 36.
39. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 461-62.
40. See id. at 462-63.
41. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
42. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
43. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
44. Id.
45. See id.
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More recently, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,46 the Court
explained that freedom of association has taken on two meanings: (1)
freedom of intimate association and (2) freedom of expressive
association.47 Freedom of intimate association shields "certain kinds
of highly personal relationships... from unjustified interference by
the State," thus "safeguard[ing] the ability independently to define
one's identity."" Such relationships are characterized by "relative
smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and
maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of
the relationship."4 9 Although the Court declined to define the
relationships that qualify for this protection, it gave as examples the
formation and maintenance of a family, and the bringing up and
instruction of children.5"
In contrast, the freedom of expressive association looks outward
from the home towards societal and political engagement. This
freedom involves the individual's "right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends."'" Expressive association, therefore, is
rooted in the Patterson line of cases discussed above. Although the
Court's recent cases concerning free association and antidiscrimination primarily have invoked this form of association, these
cases differ in one striking respect from Patterson and its immediate
post-civil rights era progeny) 2 Whereas in Pattersonthe state could be
seen as buttressing the agenda of conservative forces against the
expressive association rights of civil rights reformists, now it is the
state's championship of civil rights that battens on the expressive
association rights of conservative associations.
This curious reversal of positions illustrates the steadfast principle
that in the ongoing dialogue between people and representative
government, the free association right "shield[s] dissident expression
from suppression by the majority."54 The Dale majority held that the
state may not intrude on that prerogative even if it believes its actions
are justified by an enlightened purpose. 5 In previous cases, however,
the Court had upheld the state's interest in eliminating invidious
discrimination as one such purpose justifying infringement of the right
46. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
47. Id. at 617-18.
48. Id. at618-19.
49. Id. at 620.
50. See id. at 619.
51. Id. at 622.
52. For a discussion of these cases, see infra Part I.C.
53. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 19, at 1516 (stating that some critics view
freedom of association as the "frightful right-wing step-child" of the First
Amendment, "principally useful ... to protect the prerogatives of people in white
hoods, of sexist old-boys networks, and of homophobes").
54. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
55. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000).
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to free association. 6 The next section provides an overview of antidiscrimination legislation.
B. Civil Rights and Employment DiscriminationLaws
The civil rights movement, which gave rise to the litigation in
Patterson, also provided the impetus for Congress to enact the Civil
Rights Act of 1964," 7 a comprehensive source of anti-discrimination
legislation." The same liberal political movement thus, ironically,
informed and shaped both freedom of association and antidiscrimination laws.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 enacted anti-discrimination legislation
with an extensive reach. Title I of the Act deals with voting rights,
Titles II and III with equal access to public facilities and
accommodations, Title IV with discrimination in education, Title VI
with discrimination in federally assisted programs, and Title VII with
discrimination in employment. 9 Congress's Commerce Clause6
power authorizes the Act to reach discrimination by private parties.6'
56. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-24; Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176
(1976).

57. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
58. See Mack A. Player, Employment Discrimination Law 199 (1988).
59. See id.
60. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
61. See Player, supra note 58, at 203 & n.6 (explaining that the Supreme Court
confirmed the constitutionality of Congress's power to regulate discrimination by
private parties in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)). It should be pointed out that state
employees, e.g. public school teachers, need not depend on Title VII for redress for
wrongful dismissal or other employment decisions which affect them adversely. Since
the state is their employer, they can bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by school officials
acting under the color of state law. See Glover v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1168 (S.D. Ohio 1998). Under an equal protection claim,
a plaintiff suing on sexual orientation grounds would have to show that the state,
through its policy-making authority, intentionally discriminated against him without
some rational basis for its action. See Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279,
1287 (D. Utah 1998). Gay and lesbian public school teachers have been relatively
successful in obtaining redress for wrongful dismissal under an equal protection
theory. Compare Weaver, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1289, and Glover, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1169
(citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), for proposition that animus towards
homosexuals is not a rational basis for state action), with Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch.
Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 956 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the record shows school officials
responded positively to plaintiff's complaints and federal judges should refrain from
using rational basis review to "impose their own social values" on school
administrators). For a thesis that arguments based on privacy and equality are
potentially more powerful than sex discrimination arguments for litigants suing for
sexual orientation discrimination, see Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex
DiscriminationArgument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 471 (2001).
For an argument that sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination "because of
sex" under Title VII, see Anthony E. Varona and Jeffrey M. Monks, En/gendering
Equality: Seeking Relief Under Title VII Against Employment Discrimination Based
on Sexual Orientation, 7 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 67 (2000).
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Title VII thus became the first broad-based legislation regulating
employment discrimination in the private sector."'2
The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to require the
"removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on
the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications." 3 Originally,
Title VII exempted from its anti-discrimination mandate "educational
institution employees connected with educational activities," that is,
employees primarily engaged in teaching. 4
In 1972, Congress
revoked this exemption, having found that discrimination in education
was as pervasive as in other employment settings."
The House
Committee on Education and Labor emphasized the importance of
combating discrimination in educational institutions."
The
Committee stated that educational institutions expose the young to
the ideas that shape their future development.17 Therefore, permitting
discrimination in these institutions would, "more than in any other
area," promote future discrimination through the perpetuation of
stereotypes."s
There is currently no federal statute prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.6" Title VII prohibits
discriminatory action against individuals on the basis of "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."' 71 Courts have resisted expanding the
interpretation of "sex" to include sexual orientation. 7' Title VII

62. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Elizabeth J. Norman, Employment Discrimination
Law and Practice 1 (2001).
63. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (quoting Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)).
64. House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, at 19 (1971) [hereinafter House Comm. on Educ. and
Labor], reprinted in Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare,
92nd Cong., Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
at 79 (1972) [hereinafter Legislative History of' the EEOA]; Kunda v. Muhlenberg
Coll., 621 F.2d 532, 550 (3d Cir. 1980).
65. See House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, supra note 64, at 79.
66. See id. at 79-80.
67. See id. at 80.
68. Id.
69. See J. Banning Jasiunas, Note, Is ENDA the Answer? Can a "Separate But
Equal" Federal Statute Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment
Discrimination?, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1529, 1535-36 (2000). The Employment NonDiscrimination Act ("ENDA") proposes to extend federal anti-discrimination
protection to gays and lesbians. It was introduced in the House in 1994 but has so far
failed to be passed by Congress, failing in the Senate by one vote in 1996. See id. at
1535-36 & n.46; see also id. at 1545-47 (describing basic framework of ENDA).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
71. The leading federal case holding that Title VII does not extend to sexual
orientation discrimination is DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.
1979). But see Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D.
Or. 2002), for a minority view that Congress did not intend the benefits of Title VII to
be restricted to heterosexual employees.
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expressly does not preempt state law,72 however, so long as the state
law comports with or enlarges the rights granted by Title VII.7 3 Thus,
states, acting on the power reserved to them by the Tenth
Amendment, may enact laws prohibiting employment discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.7 4 To date twelve states and the
District of Columbia have passed such laws, modeled on Title VII,
covering public and private employment." In addition, over two
hundred cities and counties have passed ordinances to the same
effect,7" and the President as well as governors of seven states have
issued executive orders banning discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in public employment.77 States and cities have also
enacted laws proscribing discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in public accommodations, education, and housing.7" As
state anti-discrimination laws expand in number and scope, the
potential for conflict with freedom of association rights has
increased.7 9
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7.
73. Player, supra note 58, at 203.
74. See Stephen P. Anway, Note, The Restoration of States' Civil Rights Authority:
An Alternative Approach to Expressive Association After Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1473, 1502-04 (2001) (outlining states' affirmative duty and
voluntary authority to prevent invidious discrimination).
75. See Cal. Gov't Code § 12940 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 46a-81c (West 1995), D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1402.11 (2001); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 368-1
(1993); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 4 (1999 & Supp. 2002); Minn. Stat. § 363.03
(1991 & Supp. 2003): Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 613.330 (Michie 2000); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 354-A:6, :7 (1995 & Supp. 2002); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-4 (West 2002); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 28-5-7 (2000 & Supp. 2002); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, § 961 (1995); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 21, § 495 (1987 & Supp. 2002); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.36(1)(d) (West 2002);
see also N.Y.A.B. No. 1971, 225th Leg., (N.Y. 2001) (amending N.Y. Exec. Law § 291
as of Jan. 16, 2003). See generally Lambda Legal, Summary of States Which Prohibit
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/documents/record?record=185 (last visited Mar. 27, 2003) [hereinafter
Summary of States].
76. See generally Lambda Legal, Summary of States, Cities, and Counties Which
Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, at www.lambdalegal.org/cgi)in/iowa/documents/record?record=217 (last visited Mar. 27, 2003) [hereinafter
Summary of Cities].
77. Summary of States, supra note 75. The states are Colorado, Delaware,
Louisiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington. Id.
78. Id.; Summary of Cities, supra note 76.
79. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656-57 & n.2 (2000). Justice
Rehnquist discussed how New Jersey's use of the term "public accommodations"traditionally applied to commercial enterprises such as inns, restaurants, and common
carriers -expanded to include nonprofit membership associations such as the Boy
Scouts, thus heightening potential for anti-discrimination laws to encroach on First
Amendment expressive association rights. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court held
that in New Jersey, "place" refers to "more than a fixed location." Dale v. Boy Scouts
of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1209 (N.J. 1999). Therefore, "[a] membership association, like
Boy Scouts, may be a 'place' of public accommodation even if the accommodation is
provided at 'a moving situs."' Id. at 1210 (citation omitted); see also Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (outlining history of Minnesota's public
accommodations law).
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C. Freedom to Exclude Cases
This section examines several key cases in which the Supreme
Court has addressed the conflict between freedom of association and
anti-discrimination laws, tracing the development of the Court's
jurisprudence in this area up to Dale.
1. Runyon: Invidious Discrimination Is Not a Constitutionally
Protected Right
In Runyon v. McCrary, the Supreme Court addressed whether
private schools could refuse to admit students because of their race."'
After the Court ordered the desegregation of public schools in Brown
v. Board of Education," many white parents, particularly in the South,
sent their children to private segregated schools. 2 When black
parents responded to advertisements placed by two such segregated
schools, their children were denied admission because of their race. 3
The children filed a class action
against the school proprietors alleging
4
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1
In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court held that the schools'
practices of racial exclusion violated section 1981Y Next, the Court
analyzed whether section 1981 as applied infringed the schools' rights
of free association or the white parents' right to direct their children's
education."
The Court noted that while "[i]nvidious private discrimination may
be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association ...it
80. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 164 (1976).
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82. See Mary-Michelle Upson Hirschoff, Comment, Runyon v. McCrary and
Regulation of Private Schools, 52 hnd. L.J. 747, 747 & n.5 (1977).
83. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 165.
84. Id. at 163-64. Section 1981 provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is
enjoyed by white citizens .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000); see also Runyon, 427 U.S.
at 164 n.1.
85. Because the schools offered educational services to the general public, section
1981 obligated them to contract equally with white and nonwhite pupils. Runyon, 427
U.S. at 172-73. The Court discussed at length whether Congress intended section
1981 to reach racial discrimination by private parties. Concluding that it did, the
Court noted that the breadth of the statute was within Congress's Thirteenth
Amendment power. Id. at 168-72. Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, filed a
dissent. He objected that white citizens enjoyed no right to contract with an unwilling
private party; likewise, under section 1981 black citizens did not have such a right, and
therefore the statute failed to supply plaintiffs with a cause of action. Id. at 193-95
(White, J.,dissenting). He expressed concern that section 1981 should not be
extended to force admission of unwelcome members to social clubs with racially
exclusionary policies, warning that Congress had intended that racial discrimination
should be banned only in employment and housing. 1d. at 212 (White, J., dissenting).
This concern foreshadowed the conflict between anti-discrimination laws and the free
association rights of private organizations in the Roberts trilogy and in Dale.
86. Id. at 175.
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has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections." 7
Therefore, while parents were entitled to send their children to
schools that teach the desirability of racial segregation, and children
were entitled to attend them, it did not follow that the schools were
entitled to practice racial discrimination." The admission of nonwhite
students would not offend the schools' freedom of association because
there was no evidence that their presence would impinge on the
schools' ability to teach any ideas or beliefs. 9
Section 1981 as applied also did not abrogate any recognized
parental rights.9" The Court's previous cases had established the right
of parents to send their children to private rather than public
schools, 9' and to schools that offered specialized instruction,9 2 but not
to replace state educational requirements with their own educational
agendas.9 In this case, parents could send their children to private
schools, and the schools could continue to teach whatever ideals they
valued.94 Noting the correlation between "equality of opportunity to
obtain an education and the equality of employment opportunity[,]" 91
the Court decided that the application of section 1981 to private
schools was permissible because it furthered Congress's goal of
eliminating racial discrimination in contracting between private
parties.96
In Runyon, the Court weighed Congress's anti-discriminatory
agenda in enacting section 1981 against the defendants'
constitutionally protected rights. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,97
the Court developed this approach into a compelling state interest
balancing test.

87. Id. at 176 (alteration in original) (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,
470 (1972)).

88. Id. at 175-76.
89. Id. at 176.
90. Id. at 177.
91. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court affirmed the liberty right of parents to
"direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925); see Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176-77 (quoting Pierce).
92. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court validated the due process right of parents to
send their children to schools that offered specialized instruction in German. 262 U.S.
390 (1923); see Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176 (discussing Meyer).
93. In Wisconsin v. Yoder the Court emphasized that Pierce did not extend to the
proposition that parents "may replace state educational requirements with their own
idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy
member of society." 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972); see Runyon, 427 U.S. at 177 (quoting
Yoder).
94. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 177.
95. Id. at 179 n.16.
96. See id. at 179.

97. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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2. The Roberts Trilogy: The Compelling State Interest Balancing Test
The Runyon Court was careful to point out that neither
section 1981 nor the facts of the case presented a question of the right
of private clubs to discriminate in their membership decisions."s In
Roberts, the Court was presented with just such a question.
The Jaycees, a non-profit membership organization dedicated to
encouraging the personal development of young men through
participation in local and national education and philanthropic
activities, allowed women to join only as associate members.9 9 After
the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters admitted women as regular
members, the national organization advised them that it was
considering revoking their charters. "' Members of both chapters filed
charges against the national organization alleging violation of the
Minnesota Human Rights Act that banned discrimination in public
accommodations on the basis of sex."" The national organization
asserted that application of the Act would infringe the male members'
free speech and association rights." 2
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court of
seven Justices." 3 The Court held that an organization's right of free
association could be abridged justifiably by "regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas,
that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms.""' 4 Here, the state's compelling interest in
98. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 167.
99. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612-13.
100. Id.at 614.
101. Id. at 614-15. The Minnesota Human Rights Act provides, in pertinent part,
that "lilt is an unfair discriminatory practice: ...To deny to any person the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed,
religion, disability, national origin, or sex." Minn. Stat. § 363.03 subd. 3 (1991 & Supp.
2002); see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615.
102. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615.
103. Id. at 612: see also id. at 631 (stating that Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun took no part in decision).
104. Id.at 623. Justice O'Connor filed a concurrence expressing concern that the
Court's test both overprotected activities that should not be constitutionally
safeguarded and underprotected those that deserve First Amendment shelter. Id. at
632 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Rather than conditioning constitutional protection
for an association's membership choices on the content of, or reason for, its message,
Justice O'Connor proposed a test that distinguished between commercial and
expressive associations. Id. at 632-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Commercial
associations would be subject to rational government regulation, but regulations
applied to expressive associations would have to be "'narrowly drawn' to serve a
'sufficiently strong, subordinating interest."' Id. at 634 (O'Connor, J.,concurring)
(citation omitted). The determinative factor in deciding whether an association is
commercial or expressive should be whether the organization engages primarily in
activity that has traditionally been privileged by the First Amendment. Id. at 635
(O'Connor, J.,
concurring). With regard to Roberts, Justice O'Connor concluded that
the Jaycees' activity was predominantly commercial: the organization primarily
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eliminating discrimination against women warranted any infringement
of the male members' free association rights.1 5
Through full
membership in the Jaycees, women would be able to benefit from
equal access to "goods, privileges, and advantages" such as leadership
training and business networking."" ( The Minnesota Human Rights
Act did not purport to suppress speech, did not single out proscribed
and permissible activity based on viewpoint, and did not rest
enforcement on unconstitutional measures.""
Finally, the Act
promoted the state's interests through the least restrictive means: it
did not impair the Jaycees' ability to pursue its activities or
promulgate its views; neither did it obligate the Jaycees to change its
mission or to admit members who embraced tenets different from
those of its present members."l "
In its next two free association cases presenting similar membership
issues, the Court continued to apply the Roberts compelling state
interest test. The first case, Board of Directorsof Rotary International
v. Rotary Club of Duarte,"9 presented a situation very similar to that
in Roberts. The Rotary Club, a large organization composed of
business and professional men engaged in philanthropy, restricted
engaged in promoting business skills; it "refer[red] to its members as customers and
membership as a product it [was] selling." Id. at 639 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766, 769 (D. Minn. 1982)).
Hence, Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court that the Jaycees could not use the
First Amendment as a shield against Minnesota's law requiring the organization to
open its membership on a non-discriminatory basis. Id. at 640 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Post-Dale, several commentators have proposed that the Court adopt a
test based on Justice O'Connor's concurrence as a way to accommodate both
expressive association and anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note
19, at 1563-87; Sean B. Druyon, Note, A Call for a Modified Standard: The Supreme
Court Struggles to Define When Private Organizations Can Discriminate in
Contravention of State Antidiscrimination Laws in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 79
Neb. L. Rev. 794, 819 (2000); Adrianne K. Zahner, Note, A ComprehensiveApproach
to Conflicts Between Anti-Discrimination Laws and Freedom of Expressive
Association After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 373, 391-92
(2001).
105. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 640. The Court approved Minnesota's expansive view of
public accommodations that included "quasi-commercial" activity like that pursued
by the Jaycees. Id. at 625. Such a view recognized the necessity, for individuals and
for society, of facilitating "economic advancement and political and social
integration" for historically disadvantaged groups such as women. Id. at 626.
106. Id. at 626.
107. Id. at 623.
108. Id. at 626-27. The Court rejected the argument that women would bring a
different perspective to the organization's goals, thus effecting changes in the Jaycees'
ideology if allowed to vote. Id. at 627. It also rejected the allegation that accepting
women as full members would alter the group's expression because of the audience's
"gender-based assumptions." Id. The Court explained that these contentions were
based on unwarranted stereotypes that men and women have differing outlooks and
aspirations, and were insufficient to support the Jaycees' assertion that full admission
of women would change the substance or effect of the organization's message. Id. at
627-28.
109. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
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membership to men only.'"' The Rotary Club in Duarte, California,
admitted three women, prompting Rotary International to revoke its
The Duarte Club sued the head organization, alleging
charter.'
violation of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act which proscribed sex
discrimination in public accommodations." 2 Rotary responded that its
members enjoyed the fellowship afforded by the men-only policy, and
this policy facilitated the club's operation in foreign countries." 3
Using the Roberts test, the Court, in another unanimous decision in
which seven Justices participated," 4 held that the admission of women
did not impose unconstitutionally on the organization's freedom of
expressive association." 5 Justice Powell, delivering the opinion of the
Court, explained that the Unruh Act did not force the club to
relinquish or change any of its activities."' The Act's furtherance of
California's compelling interest in combating discrimination against
women justified any infringement on the organization's expression. 1 7
Decided one year after Duarte, New York State Club Ass'n v. City
of New York' demonstrated how far the Court was prepared to go in
upholding anti-discrimination laws against free association claims. In
this case, a consortium of private clubs brought suit against New York
City in response to a 1984 amendment to the city's Human Rights
Law. '9 The previous law had exempted any club that proved itself
"distinctly private" from its discrimination prohibitions. 20 The
amendment allowed the city to define which clubs were "distinctly
private" by sweeping within its purview such private clubs that the city
determined to be "sufficiently public." 12' The city's purpose was to
target organizations where business deals were struck, or professional

110. Id. at 539.
111. Id.at 541.
112. Id. at 541. The Unruh Act provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction
of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex ... are entitled to the full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 51 (West 1982 &
Supp. 2003); see also Duarte, 481 U.S. at 541 n.2.
113. Duarte,481 U.S. at 541.
114. See id. at 550 (stating that Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, and that
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor took no part in the decision).
115. Id. at 549.
116. Id. at 548.
117. Id. at 549.
118. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
119. Id. at 5-7. The Human Rights Law now extended to any institution, club or
place of accommodation that has "more than four hundred members, provides
regular meal service and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space,
facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or business." N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9)
(1996); see also New York Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 6.
120. N.Y. Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 5.
121. Id.
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those commercial benefits
connections forged, so as to make
22
accessible to women and minorities.
The consortium alleged that the law violated the clubs' right of
expressive association. 23 All nine Justices voted to uphold the
amended Human Rights Law. 124 Justice White, writing for the Court,
reasoned that the law did not mandate any changes in the clubs'
protected First Amendment activities: The clubs remained free to
exclude anyone who did not share their ideals, but they simply were
prevented from making membership decisions using any of the
statute's proscribed criteria. 125 As a final recourse, a club could apply
for a case-by-case analysis of whether the law hampered its
associational or expressive activities, but the Court cautioned that a
eliminating discrimination would be
state's compelling interest in
12
consideration.
the
in
weighed
Under New York Club Ass'n, therefore, New York City was
entitled to create what was effectively a rebuttable presumption that
an association was "public" enough to be subject to its antidiscrimination laws. The reach of anti-discrimination laws appeared
expansive, but in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, Inc., 27 the Court signaled that in some situations the
First Amendment would curtail the scope of such laws.
3. Hurley: The Right Not To Speak
In 1993, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston ("GLIB") applied to march in an annual St. Patrick's Day
parade organized by representatives from several veterans groups in
South Boston.2 2' By participating in the parade, GLIB intended to
celebrate its members' Irish heritage and sexual orientation, and to
express solidarity with a counterpart group in New York. 12 9 When the
122. Id. at 12. Benevolent associations and religious organizations remained
outside the reach of the amendment. Id. at 6-7.
123. Id. at 13. The consortium also alleged that the amended law's exemption for
benevolent and religious organizations violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 15. The Court held that New York City had a rational
basis for exempting these organizations, namely, these organizations did not afford
the same commercial opportunities as the consortium's clubs. Id. at 16-17.
124. Id. at 3. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion which Justice Kennedy
joined, arguing that the expressive purposes of some organizations that fell within the
reach of the amendment might nevertheless be considerably impeded if they were not
able to restrict their membership, and that their right of free association must be
protected. Id. at 18-19 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 13.
126. Id. at 14 & n.5.
127. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
128. Id. at 560-61. GLIB had also applied to march in 1992. The parade organizers
had denied GLIB's application, but the group marched anyway pursuant to a state
court order. Id. at 561.
129. Id.
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parade organizers denied GLIB's application, the group sued alleging
that the organizers had violated the Commonwealth's public
accommodations law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.""
Employing a traditional free speech rather than free association
analysis, a unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Souter, upheld
the organizers' First Amendment right not to adopt GLIB's
message. 3 ' Key to the Court's decision was the fact that both GLIB
and the parade organizers sought to convey messages. 32 The problem
was that GLIB's message, celebrating its members' sexual identity,
was not one the parade organizers wished to express. The organizers
did not object to openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals marching
in other units in the parade, but they drew the line at GLIB marching
as a distinct unit under its own banner.'33 The Court agreed that every
unit participating in a parade is customarily perceived as contributing
to the message of the parade organizers.' 34 Here, GLIB's presence
would signal that the organizers approved of, or at least tolerated, the
sexual orientation of the GLIB members.'35 Application of the
Massachusetts anti-discrimination law would thus force the organizers
to modify their message in conformity with the state's agenda.' 36 Such
state action is anathema to the First Amendment, even if the state's
purpose is not to co-opt the speaker's expression, but rather to
achieve a bias-free society.'37
Reconciling its decision with its previous cases, the Court pointed
out that in Roberts and New York State Club Ass'n, state law left the
associations free to exclude applicants with views contrary to those of

130. Id. The relevant Massachusetts law prohibits "any distinction, discrimination
or restriction on account of... sexual orientation ... relative to the admission of any
person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement."
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 98 (1992); see Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.
131. Id. at 566. The Court stated that "one important manifestation of the
principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to
say."' Id. at 573 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S.
1, 16 (1986)); cf Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)
("Freedom of association ... plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.").
132. Analogizing a parade to a protest march, the Court reasoned that parade
marchers intend to convey a collective message to bystanders, hence "[p]arades
are ... a form of expression, not just motion." Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568. Similarly,
GLIB's purpose in marching in the parade, celebrating its members' sexual identity,
was also expressive. Id. at 570. GLIB had handed out flyers outlining its members'
objectives, and intended to march behind a banner inscribed with the group's name.
Id. at 570, 572.
133. Id. at 572.
134. Id. at 576.
135. Id. at 574.
136. Id. at 578.
137. Id. at 578-79.
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the organization.' 38 Similarly, GLIB could lawfully be excluded
because its expression contradicted the organizers' message.13 9
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 4 the Court extended the free
speech analysis of Hurley to the Boy Scouts' free association claim
that it had a constitutionally protected right to exclude a gay
scoutmaster.
4. Dale: The Right Not To Associate
The Boy Scouts is a private, non-profit organization whose main
activity is instilling its values in its young male members. 141 James
Dale, a member of the Boy Scouts from ages eight to eighteen, was
"an exemplary Scout" who became an assistant scoutmaster. 142 While
holding this position, he also became co-president of his college's gay
and lesbian association and, in this capacity, gave an interview to a
newspaper on the need of gay teenagers to have homosexual role
models. 43 Soon after the interview was published, the Boy Scouts
revoked Dale's membership in accordance with its policy of not
accepting homosexual members. 144 Dale filed suit against the Boy
law
Scouts alleging violation of New Jersey's public accommodations
45
which proscribes sexual orientation discrimination.
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld the Boy Scouts' expressive
association right to revoke Dale's membership. The Court first
determined that the Boy Scouts qualified as an expressive association
because it engaged in the communication of values to its members by
way of the scoutmasters' instruction and example. 46 Then, departing
from previous practice in free association cases, Chief Justice
Rehnquist announced that the Court must "give deference to an
association's assertions regarding the nature of its expression, [and to]
''47
an association's view of what would impair its expression. 1
138. Id.at 580.
139. Id. at 580-81.
140. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
141. Id. at 644.
142. Id. Dale had attained the rank of Eagle Scout, a very high honor awarded by
the Boy Scouts. Id.
143. Id. at 645.
144. Id. In a letter responding to Dale's inquiry into the reason for the revocation
of his membership, an executive of the Monmouth Council replied that the Boy
Scouts "specifically forbid membership to homosexuals." Id. (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
145. The New Jersey public accommodations law provides that "[a]ll persons shall
have the opportunity to obtain ...all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of any place of public accommodation.., without discrimination because
of ...sexual orientation ....This opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a
civil right." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-4 (West 2002); see Dale, 530 U.S. at 661-62.
146. Dale, 530 U.S. at 649-50.
147. Id. at 653. The dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, vigorously
opposed the majority's standard of deference. Id. at 663-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Accordingly, the Court accepted as sufficient proof of the Boy Scouts'
view of homosexuality its assertions in its Brief that homosexuality
was "not morally straight" or "clean" and that the Boy Scouts refused
to endorse homosexual conduct as legitimate. 4
Explaining that Dale was a leader in the gay community and a
crusader for gay rights, the Court concluded that his readmission
would force the Boy Scouts to express a message to its members and
to the world that it condoned homosexual behavior as legitimate.'
Countering Dale's argument that the Boy Scouts had not revoked the
membership of heterosexual scoutmasters who had openly disagreed
with the organization's position on homosexuality, the Court stated
that an organization may retain dissenting members without giving up
its First Amendment rights.' 5
The Court rationalized that a
dissenting scoutmaster "sends a distinctly different message" from a
scoutmaster who is openly homosexual and advocates gay rights.'
Finally, the Court concluded that New Jersey's interest in
combating discrimination did not outweigh the "severe intrusion" on
the Boy Scouts' expressive association rights.5 2
The Court
Citing Roberts and Duarte, the dissenters insisted that the Court must independently
inquire whether a group is in fact expressing the message it claims during litigation,
although it may not allow its disapproval with the message to color its constitutional
determination. Id. at 684-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Failure to conduct an
independent review would make a mockery of civil rights laws because an association
could disguise any unlawful discrimination as constitutionally protected expression
simply by claiming it as such in litigation. Id. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
dissenters would require an organization to demonstrate that it has taken and
promoted an unambiguous stance conflicting with that represented by the person it
wishes to reject. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In this case, the Boy Scouts' statement
disapproving homosexuality lacked any underpinning in its creed and was unrelated
to a common aim or expressive endeavor of the association. Id. at 673 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Simply, it was a discriminatory exclusionary policy which, on its own, was
insufficient to support a free association claim. See id. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 650-51.
149. Id. at 653. Nonetheless, the Court took care to emphasize that an expressive
association cannot "erect a shield against anti-discrimination laws" just by claiming
that admitting certain types of people would thwart its message. Id.
The
determinative factor here was that Dale was a leader in the gay community. Id. The
expressive significance that the Court placed on Dale's leadership position is revealed
in its comparison of this case to Hurley. In both cases, according to the Court, the
presence of the unwanted member would "interfere with the [organization's] choice
not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs." Id. at 654. The dissenters
would have placed the constitutional threshold at Dale "present[ing] himself as a role
model inconsistent with" the organization's tenets. Id. at 691-92 (Stevens J.,
dissenting) (citation and emphasis omitted). That threshold was not met here because
Dale had never used his position as a scoutmaster to advance gay rights views or any
beliefs about homosexuality to his troop. Id. at 689 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
dissenters pointed out that the Boy Scouts allowed its scoutmasters to engage in
expressive activity in contravention of its policies as long as that activity was kept
outside of the organization. Id. at 690-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 655-56.
151. Id. at 656. The Court did not elaborate on the nature of the difference.
152. Id. at 659.
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distinguished Roberts and Duarte by explaining that the evidence in
those cases failed to show that any material disruption in the
organizations' messages would result from the application of antidiscrimination laws.' 53 In contrast, here, as in Hurley, the forced
inclusion of an unwelcome member would compel the organization to
alter its message to 54adhere to state policy, a result that the First
Amendment forbids.
The next section reviews the critical reactions of commentators
both in support of and in opposition to the majority's holding.
D. Dale's Aftermath
Dale has provoked a storm of impassioned debate on free
association and anti-discrimination, including a call for the Court to
overhaul its approach to freedom of association by returning it to its
political roots as a "right of self-governance" rather than as a "right of
expression.' ' 55 Commentators have expansively described the areas
of doctrine for which the case has implications: Title VII, free
exercise, fair housing, and parents' rights to direct the education of
their children, to name a few.15 ' This section outlines the arguments
offered both in opposition to and in support of Dale.
1. Opponents of Dale
Dale's detractors see the case as denying gays and lesbians equal
access to meaningful participation in civil society. 57 According to
opponents of Dale, sexual orientation claims are about "a right to
presence" in the nation's cultural and political discourse.5 5 The
economic model of equal opportunity is thus outmoded as a paradigm

153. Id. at 658.
154. Id.at 659. The dissenters took issue with the majority's reliance on Hurley.
Justice Stevens noted that "[u]nlike GLIB, Dale did not carry a banner or a sign." Id.
at 694-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Therefore, according to the dissent, Dale more
closely resembled the homosexual individuals marching in the parade's other unitswho did not express any messages about gay sexuality by their participation -than
dissenting). Further, a parade communicates messages
GLIB. Id. at 694 (Stevens, J.,
very differently from a large membership organization like the Boy Scouts. The
expression of all units in a parade is perceived as the organizers' own message. Id.
In contrast, Dale's acknowledgement of his sexual
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
orientation in a local newspaper would not be seen as conveying a message on behalf
of the Boy Scouts in the same way, because an organization as large as the Boy Scouts
is not understood to sanction the opinions that each of its members makes in milieus
outside of scouting. Id. at 697 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Mazzone, supra note 27, at 647.
156. See, e.g., supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text; Bernstein, supra note 15, at
126-38 (forecasting effects of Dale on religious organizations, hostile environment
law, campus speech codes, and housing discrimination).
157. See Hunter, supra note 18, at 1591.
158. Id. at 1626-27.
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for gay rights.'59 Drawing on that model, the line between what is
public (open to state regulation) and private (protected from state
regulation) tracks the line between commercial and non-profit
spheres. 6" By pegging civil rights to the attainment of economic
benefits, whether tangible or intangible, the market model disserves
the claims of homosexual individuals to open participation in a
democracy.'
What is at stake is not goods and services so much as
162
"the power to create and contest social meaning,"'
activity that takes
63

place in non-profit as well as commercial venues:'
One way in which social meaning is shaped is through the
characterization of speech and speaker. Critics take issue with the
Dale majority's characterization of "coming out" speech as hostile
expression, an assumption that underlies the majority's conclusion
that Dale's presence would force the Boy Scouts to convey a message
that it endorses homosexuality. 6 4 As one commentator states, the
"invisible nature of homosexuality renders speech a more central issue
for lesbian and gay equality than it usually is for race, sex, or
disability." 161
Coming out speech is commonly seen as
confrontational, hence the mere presence of an openly gay person
may be construed as subverting the expression of an organization that
66
opposes-or at least refrains from endorsing- homosexual conduct.
These critics maintain that the Dale majority's conflation of the act
of coming out with hostile speech robs gay and lesbian individuals of
the right to define themselves, and instead gives that prerogative to

159. Id. at 1630.
160. Id. at 1628.
161. Id. at 1629.
162. Id. at 1632 (quoting Madhavi Sunder, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of
Exclusion: The Intellectual Propertizationof Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 143, 144 (1996)).
163. Id. at 1629-34.
164. See Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality and Civil Rights: Re-Imagining AntiDiscrimination Laws, 17 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 565, 577 (2000) thereinafter
Hunter, Sexuality and Civil Rights] (explaining how "mere presence of an openly
[gay] person demands a rebuttal"); Hunter, supra note 18, at 1606-09 (analyzing
Court's "demonization" of Dale); Christopher S. Hargis, Note, Romer, Hurley, and
Dale: How the Supreme Court Languishes with "Special Rights," 89 Ky. L.J. 1189,
1218-19 (2000-01) (extrapolating that the presence of a homosexual scoutmaster was
perceived as an "immediate challenge" to the Boy Scouts' creed). But see Carpenter,
supra note 19, at 1551-53 (arguing that the Dale majority's implicit recognition that
the act of coming out is culturally and politically significant speech will help
government employees who are discriminated against for being open about their
homosexuality); Nancy J. Knauer, "Simply So Different": The Uniquely Expressive
Characterof the Openly Gay Individual After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 89 Ky.
L.J. 997, 999-1003 (2000-01) (stating that "Itihere is nothing particularly surprising or
new about the contention that an openly gay individual speaks volumes," and
contending that liberal commentators ignore the political significance of coming out,
when in fact such acknowledgement will lead to more and not less First Amendment
protection for openly gay people).
165. Hunter, Sexuality and Civil Rights, supra note 164, at 576.
166. Id. at 577.
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the very group seeking to expel them. "' 7 Thus, critics argue that
homosexuals, by being open about their sexuality, will automatically
be seen as pitting their message against that of an organization
seeking their exclusion, and that this will result in their automatic
exemption from state protection against discrimination. 6 A critic has
argued that to obtain this benefit from the constitutional right to
exclude, organizations will need to vocalize policies of hostility
towards certain groups about which they would rather have stayed
silent.169 Thus, an organization should be required to have the
"courage of its convictions."'"
In other words, the organization, too,
must "come out," and take the consequences of declaring its
policies. 7 '
2. Supporters of Dale
Dale's supporters assert that the decision heralds a new dawn for
First Amendment rights which have been increasingly and
unjustifiably trampled on, in the name of eliminating discrimination,
since Roberts. 7 2 These commentators contend that a state's interest in
combating discrimination should not take precedence over
constitutionally guaranteed rights. 7
According to this line of
reasoning, the First Amendment, in particular, codifies a democratic
society's rightful distrust of a state's police power over social and
political discourse; thus so-called compelling state interests that
encroach on the constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and
association should be viewed with suspicion. 7 4
Indeed, one
commentator has suggested that gay rights activists should champion

167. See Christopher S. Hargis, The Scarlet Letter -H": The Brand Left After Dale,
11 Law & Sexuality 209, 234 (2002).
168. See id. at 240-41.
169. See Hunter, supra note 18, at 1610 (explaining that litigating Dale required the
Boy Scouts to "loudly declare a policy that they had apparently wanted to keep below
the social radar screen unless necessary to eject someone").
170. Id. at 1612.
171. "Coming out" has consequences for homophobic organizations as it does for
individuals. After Dale, the Boy Scouts lost as well as gained both private and public
support. For details on the repercussions to the Boy Scouts of the organization's antigay policies, see Jeremy Patrick, A Merit Badge for Homophobia? The Boy Scouts
Earn the Right to Exclude Gays in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 10 Law & Sexuality
93, 119-20 (2001); Lisa D. Angelo, Note, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale: The Delay in
a Necessary Change with Time, 23 Whittier L. Rev. 803, 833-34 (2002).
172. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 15, at 85-89 & 85 n.il.
173. See, e.g., id. at 138-39; Steffen N. Johnson, Expressive Association and
OrganizationalAutonomy,85 Minn. L. Rev. 1639, 1665-66 (2001).
174. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 15, at 139; Johnson, supra note 173, at 1667
(arguing that the health of private associations is critical to prevent democracy from
succumbing to "tyrannical majoritarianism, in which every aspect of society is ordered
as 51 percent of the citizens prefer" (quoting Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of
Disbelief 37 (1993))).
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Dale for precisely this reason. 17' He argues that governments are
fickle defenders of the rights of homosexuals, hence the integrity of
private associations should be fiercely defended so as to provide safe
havens from which homosexuals may exercise
their political power
176
should the tide turn against them once more.
One Dale supporter contends that more than acting as a defense
against Big Brother, freedom of association is a positive force in
creating a diverse society that provides the greatest benefits to
individual citizens.1 77 Free association ensures the smooth operation
of the free market, keeping open a wide range of choices and allowing
for "efficient self-sorting."'17' Even if the price of free association is to
deny certain options to some individuals, the array of opportunities
available to them would still be greater in a free market
than if a state
7
regulation closed them out of the market altogether. 1
Finally, Dale's supporters reason that expressive association
preserves the substantive due process rights of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children, which lies at the core of intimate
associational rights of families.'"" According to its advocates, Dale
stands for the proposition that the "opportunity to influence the
upbringing of other people's children" is not a civil right. 8 ' They
further argue that parents "speak" when they choose schools and
instructors for their children, and they communicate indirectly to their
children through teachers, tutors, and other educational agents." 2
Schools amplify the messages that parents wish to transmit to their
children, and parents retain the right to exclude messages and
messengers which subvert their communications."3
Part II discusses in detail two aspects of the Dale controversy which
offer critical insight into the issues at stake in the Baden-Powell
hypothetical.

175. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 19, at 1519.
176. See, e.g., id. at 1525-33 (declaring that "Itihe First Amendment created gay
America" and outlining the history of state oppression of gay rights associations); id.
at 1588 (noting capriciousness of governments' policy towards gays); accord Johnson,
supra note 173, at 1666-67 (supporting Carpenter's argument that Dale preserves the
right of gay organizations to limit their leadership to homosexuals).
177. See Epstein, supra note 17, at 132-34.
178. Id. at 133.
179. See id. at 132-33 (providing example that in a free market, a female lawyer
who is discriminated against by one law firm will be able to find other firms that
discriminate in her favor); see also Hirschoff, supra note 82, at 759-60 (warning that
Runyon reduces diversity among private schools and limits availability of alternatives
to state schools, thus threatening to "standardize" children by subjecting them to a
uniform educational system).
180. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
181. Johnson, supra note 173, at 1666.
182. Garnett, supra note 13, at 1870 (citing Gilles, supra note 8, at 1016).
183. See Paulsen, supra note 13, at 1943.
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II. SCHOOLS AS QUASI-EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS AND THE
DEBATE OVER EDUCATIONAL AUTHORITY

The Court's "freedom to exclude" cases and Dale's critical
aftermath pose two questions fundamental to the determination of
whether Baden-Powell's free expression defense should prevail over
Doe's employment discrimination claim.
The first question is
whether, under Dale, a private school's free association right includes
exemption from anti-discrimination laws. In Runyon, the Court
accepted that private schools enjoy a right of free association but held
that they may not discriminate against black students.1 4 The Boy
Scouts' expressive activity is analogous to that of schools, as both seek
to inculcate values in young people. Yet in Dale, the Court held that
the Boy Scouts' free association right entitled the organization to
discriminate against an openly homosexual scoutmaster. 85 Section A
asks whether Runyon and Dale can be reconciled and examines one
commentator's effort to square the two cases by classifying
associations as commercial, expressive, or quasi-expressive.
The second question is whether a private school's free association
right protects the expression of parents or children. Section B
explores the argument of Dale's supporters that free association
protects the expressive right of parents to transmit messages to their
children through the expression of schools. The section then contrasts
this with an alternative view of parents as trustees responsible for
safeguarding the free expression rights of their children.
A. The CarpenterView
Dale Carpenter seeks to "reclaim the freedom of expressive
association" from both its critics and its supporters by contending that
Dale will not lead to the far-reaching consequences that either side
envisages." 6 He posits a tripartite approach. 7 to resolve conflict
between expressive association and anti-discrimination law after Dale
which is based on Justice O'Connor's suggestion, in her concurrence
to Roberts, that First Amendment protection for an association should
depend on whether it is expressive or commercial.'
Carpenter
develops a third category of quasi-expressive associations to describe
those organizations that both engage in expression and participate in
the commercial marketplace. 8 ' He argues that private schools fall
into this third category because they deliver moral instruction yet

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See supra Part I.C.1.
See supra Part I.C.4.
Carpenter, supra note 19, at 1516-17.
See id. at 1563-87.
See supra note 104.
See Carpenter, supra note 19, at 1576.
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maintain large facilities, employ many people, and hold themselves
open to members of the general public who can pay the fees.""
According to Carpenter, quasi-expressive associations present the
hard cases that require further examination of the specific activity
challenged by an anti-discrimination claim. 9 ' Primarily expressive
activities should be beyond the reach of anti-discrimination laws, but
primarily commercial
activities should be subject to such
2
regulations.1
Carpenter contends that teaching is an inherently expressive
activity.' 93 Teachers "directly transmit" the school's values when
instructing students. 94 Therefore, a private school's choice of
instructors should be shielded from anti-discrimination laws by the
freedom of expressive association." 95 In contrast, a school's janitor or
secretary does not perform an expressive function, and the school's
employment actions relating to them must comply with the state's
anti-discrimination mandates."9' According to Carpenter, the Dale
majority reached the right decision because scoutmasters perform the
same expressive function as teachers. Thus, the Boy Scouts' choice of
scoutmasters is rightly protected by the freedom of association."97
Carpenter reconciles Dale with Runyon, a case where the Court
upheld an anti-discrimination law against a private school's free
association claim, by noting that the schools could not show that the
admission of black students would impair their segregationist
message. 9 In this view, the application of anti-discrimination law in
Runyon did not restrict the schools' expressive activity.
This
explanation rests on a conception of teachers as deliverers and
students as recipients of messages that Part III questions."'9
Before proceeding to Part III, however, it is important to address
the right of parents to speak to their children through the expressive
activities of schools, an issue that underlies Carpenter's analysis and
that is implicated in Dale.""' The next section discusses in more depth
190. See id. (mentioning media outlets-such as newspapers-and large private
clubs, including the Boy Scouts, as other types of quasi-expressive associations).
191. See id. at 1576-77.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1577.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. See id. For a similar conclusion, see Troum, supra note 7, at 684 (positing that
the Boy Scouts would have a weaker free association claim if the organization
discriminated against homosexual factory employees as opposed to scoutmasters).
However, Troum reaches his conclusion through a different theory based on whether
expression is "internal versus external," and "intrinsically versus instrumentally
expressive exclusion." Id. at 671-79.
197. See Carpenter, supra note 19, at 1580.
198. See id. at 1577-78 see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 303-10 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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the philosophical debate surrounding parental authority in the
education of children.
B. Parents' Rights and the Education of Children
As Stephen G. Gilles notes, the Supreme Court has affirmed that
parents have an undisputed right to direct the education of their
children, but the Court has never explained why parents have this
prerogative."
Gilles refers to Pierce v. Society of Sisters2" 2 and Meyer
2
3
v. Nebraska," two cases from the 1920s in which the Court held that
parents have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty right to control their
children's education. 2 4
Both cases involved state statutes that
infringed the parental right: In Meyer, the Court struck down a state
statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in schools below
the eighth grade; 5 in Pierce, the Court upheld the injunction of a
state statute requiring compulsory attendance at public school.2 6
Forty years later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,2 7 the Court pronounced the
right of parents to direct the education of their children to be "beyond
debate." 2 In Yoder, this right, combined with a free exercise claim
asserted by Amish parents, defeated a state law mandating that
children attend public or private school until the age of sixteen.2 9
Gilles offers a constitutional underpinning for the Court's
affirmation of parental educational authority by arguing that these
cases are primarily about the First Amendment free speech rights of
parents. 2"1 Parents have a right to decide who shall educate their
children 'because the choice of schools and educators is a form of
speech.
Consistent with the free speech doctrine, any viewpointbased prohibition on speech would be unconstitutional. 2 Hence, a
state could not forbid parents or the schools through which they speak
to teach racism. 213 Conversely, the state cannot compel parents and
201. See Gilles, supra note 8, at 937.

202. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
203. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
204. See Pierce,268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
205. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397.
206. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530, 536. The Court emphasized that "[t]he child is not the
mere creature of the State," and that the constitution prevents the state from
"standardiz[ing] its children" by insisting that they attend only public schools. Id. at

535.
207. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
208. Id. at 232.
209. See id. at 207, 234.
210. See Gilles, supra note 8, at 944.
211. See id. at 1016-19. Richard W. Garnett incorporates this idea of school choice
as a form of speech in his argument that the Supreme Court affirmed the prerogative
of parents to determine the education of their children in three cases decided in the
October Term 1999, including Dale. See Garnett, supra note 13, at 1841, 1875-82.
212. See Gilles, supra note 8,at 1019-20.
213. See id. (arguing further that viewpoint-based speech restrictions are rarely
permitted, even those that "advance a compelling state interest").
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their chosen schools to214 speak by endorsing messages which are
contrary to their beliefs.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse presents a darker view of Meyer and
Pierce as affirming the idea that parents have a property interest in

their children. 215 Parents not only speak to, but speak through, their
children. 216 Instead of possessing individual identities, children are
perceived as voiceless "conduit[s] for the parents' religious expression,
cultural identity, and class aspirations.

' 21 7

Woodhouse contrasts the

idea of parents as owners with the concept of parents as trustees of

their children. 2" According to her view, the notion that parents hold

their children in trust for the greater community reflects the high

value that democratic republics place on individual liberty. 2 9

No

longer subject to the sole ownership of his or her parents, the child as
an individual is a member of the "national family," with his or her
own rights and claims on society. 220 The child's first duty, then, is not
22
to obey his or her parents but to prepare for citizenship. '
In an argument similar to that offered by Woodhouse, James G.

Dwyer refutes the idea of parents' rights and contends that "the child

is... not the mere creature of the parent. '222 Instead, Dwyer believes
that children's welfare should be protected by children's rights rather

than parents' rights, because the moral precept underlying our legal
culture is that "no individual is entitled to control the life of another
223
person, free from outside interference.1

214. See id. at 1020-21; see also supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing
the Dale majority's holding that a state may not compel the Boy Scouts to endorse the
legitimacy of homosexuality against its avowed policy).
215. See Woodhouse, supra note 8, at 997, 1090-91. Woodhouse links the liberty
right of parents to control their children's educations to the liberty right given bakers
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), to work long hours in unwholesome
conditions. See Woodhouse, supra note 8, at 1099 n.577. She concludes that in both
Lochner and Meyer "liberty became a yoke." Id.; see also James G. Dwyer, Parents'
Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 Cal. L.
Rev. 1371, 1413 (1994) (suggesting that parents' control over children's lives "can
manifest some of the 'badges and incidents' of slavery"). But see Garnett, supra note
13, at 1877 (responding that Pierce is best read as a reminder of "moral limits on the
claims of the liberal state, the independence of associations, and the importance of
civil society").
216. See Woodhouse, supra note 8, at 1114.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 1038-39. Woodhouse argues that Meyer was a deeply reactionary
response to ideas such as this which posed a threat of "radical social reform." Id. at
1085. Although Meyer's result was "pluralist and libertarian," it was in fact driven by
a conservative agenda to bolster patriarchal and property interests. Id. at 1084-85.
219. See id. at 1039.
220. Id. at 1002, 1051.
221. See id. at 1051.
222. Dwyer, supra note 215, at 1446. Dwyer was responding to the Court's
statement in Pierce v. Society of Sisters that "[tIhe child is not the mere creature of the
State." 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
223. Dwyer, supra note 215, at 1373.
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Conceding that the interests of parents and children are often in
harmony and interdependent, and that family life is an important part
of a child's self-conception, Dwyer nevertheless maintains that the
focus in legal disputes over child-rearing should be on the child's
interests rather than on the rights of parents. 224 He argues that
focusing on the child's interests will enable the state to play a bigger
role in the care and education of children, and to support state
intervention on behalf of children where parents engage in harmful
parenting practices.225
Dwyer asserts that the focus on the child's interests will not result in
unwarranted state intrusion into the family by suggesting that such a
focus will also serve to limit the extent of permissible state
intervention. 226 Acting as agent for the child, the parent may act
against the state in the child's best interests should the state intrude
too far.
With regard to education, increased state regulation of
schools will not result in children being standardized, because parents
will continue to convey their beliefs to their children at home and
because schools value individuality and diversity.228
Part III takes up these themes in a discussion of the state's interest
in education. This part examines the Baden-Powell hypothetical
within the analytical framework established by the Court in Roberts.
III. ANALYZING THE BADEN-POWELL HYPOTHETICAL UNDER THE
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST

The Roberts test, as articulated by the Dale Court, sets out a threestep inquiry into whether an anti-discrimination law abrogates the
right of free association: (1) whether the organization engages in
expressive activity; (2) whether the inclusion of the plaintiff interferes
with the organization's expression; and (3) whether the state has a
compelling interest which justifies any interference with the
organization's expression, and if so whether it has advanced its
interest through the least restrictive means of achieving its end.229
This part analyzes the Baden-Powell hypothetical using the above
three-step inquiry. Section A concludes that Baden-Powell engages in
expressive activity and is entitled to the iight of free association.
Section B argues that the inquiry into whether Doe's continued

224. Id. at 1378-79.
225. See id. at 1372.
226. See id. at 1438.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 1444. Dwyer was probably responding to concerns raised by the
Court in Meyer v. Nebraska in its disturbing evocation of Plato's Commonwealth and
of Sparta, where children were separated from their parents and placed under state
supervision, so as to "submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens." 262 U.S.
390, 401-02 (1923).
229. See supra Part I.C.4 (discussing Dale).
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presence at Baden-Powell interferes with the school's expression is
fact-specific and not foreclosed by Dale. Section C contends that the
state's compelling interests in employment and education should
prevail over Baden-Powell's expressive association claim.
A. Expressive Activity
The first inquiry is easily answered. In Runyon, the Court clearly
treated private schools as organizations enjoying the right of
expressive association, and the educational process as implicating the
right of intimate association.21 In Roberts, the Court again identified
the education of children as an activity protected by the intimate
association right,2 31 and Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, listed
232
the "instruction of the young" as an example of expressive activity.
Under Carpenter's theory of schools as quasi-expressive associations,
the school's choice of teachers is an expressive activity shielded by the
freedom of association. There is no question that Baden-Powell, a
private school engaged in the education of boys and young men, is
entitled to claim that its dismissal of Doe is protected by the First
Amendment rights of expressive and intimate association.
B. Interference with Expression
The second inquiry would appear to be foreclosed by the Dale
majority's deference to the organization's statement of what its
expression is and what would impair that expression.2 33 Baden-Powell
has asserted that it does not approve of homosexuality and refuses to
endorse any statement that legitimizes such conduct. The majority's
conclusion that an instructor, by virtue of being openly gay,
necessarily imports a pro-homosexual message into an organization,234
also seems to cut off further examination of the issue.
The equation of "coming out" with pro-homosexual speech,
however, deserves closer attention. In support of its conclusion that
Dale's presence would force the Boy Scouts to express a message to
its members and to the world that it condoned homosexual behavior,
the Court noted that Dale was both a leader in the gay community
and a gay rights activist.235 If Dale had, instead, been merely a
member of his college's gay and lesbian organization, and had never
prominently participated in gay rights activities, it would not logically
230. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
232. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring).

233. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.; see also Paulsen, supra note 13, at
1933 (stating that "Dale's public homosexuality, and public press attention to his
views" caused his expulsion from the Boy Scouts).
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follow that his presence would force the Boy Scouts to send any
message endorsing homosexuality. In fact, one year after the Dale
decision, a Washington, D.C., commission on human rights ordered a
local Boy Scouts organization to reinstate a gay troop leader,
explaining that, unlike the facts in Dale, the scoutmaster in question
had not been a leader in the gay rights movement. 236 Therefore, it
would appear that the outcome in the Baden-Powell hypothetical
should depend on nuances in the facts. Specifically, the result should
hinge upon the nature of the message expressed by Doe and the
context in which it was conveyed.
The following three scenarios provide examples of Doe's
involvement in the hypothetical gay and lesbian organization,
illustrating a spectrum of expression from passive to activist. In the
first scenario, Doe, in his capacity as co-president of the gay and
lesbian organization, represents the organization to a local newspaper
as a support group for homosexual individuals rather than as a
lobbyist for gay rights. Under these facts, it would be difficult for
Baden-Powell to claim that Doe's presence as a teacher forced the
school to send a message endorsing homosexual behavior because
Doe's message would lack the confrontational tone customarily
coupled with a more activist agenda.
In the second hypothetical, Doe makes a statement concerning gay
and lesbian individuals' need for homosexual role models. A court
could regard this statement as being part of a more assertive agenda,
similar to GLIB's intent to celebrate homosexual identity and to
express solidarity with New York's Irish gay and lesbian marchers.2 37
According to the analysis in Hurley, this may be enough to violate
Baden-Powell's free association right by altering the school's
expression that homosexuality is unacceptable. 23 8 It is questionable,
viewed
however, whether a school, like a parade, could reasonably be
239
work.
of
outside
communications
employees'
its
as endorsing
In the final scenario, Doe makes a statement exactly like Dale's,
stating that homosexual teenagers need gay role models. 21 Given
Doe's position as a teacher in a boys' school, such a statement falls at
the activist end of the spectrum because a court might reasonably view
236. The scoutmaster, Michael Geller, had joined the Boy Scouts when he was
eleven and, like Dale, had attained the rank of Eagle Scout before becoming a
scoutmaster. See Fox News: Special Rep. with Brit Hume (Fox Broadcasting Co.,
June 22, 2001), available at 2001 WL 5000750. But see Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. House
Vote Backs Gay Benefits; D.C. Workers' Partners Would Get Coverage, Wash. Post,
Sept. 26, 2001, at B1 (reporting that the House voted 262 to 152 to set aside the
commission's ruling), available at 2001 WL 28359856.
237. See supra text accompanying note 129.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37.
239. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (stating that the
determination whether a teacher was fit to teach should not hinge on his affiliations
outside of school); supra note 154.
240. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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it as tantamount to a declaration of intent on Doe's part to serve as
advisor and role model to any of his students who might wish to
discuss their sexual orientation with him, or even as an invitation to
his students to do so. Following the Roberts line of cases, this
situation should be easily resolved in the school's favor under the
organization's undisputed right to exclude members who express
views at odds with the views of the organization.24'
The Dale Court articulated a standard of deference to expressive
organizations that raise a free association defense in an antidiscrimination action, but its claim to rely solely on the litigation
claims of the organization is belied by its own (admittedly minimal)
review of the facts.242 More important, the Court voiced the caveat
that an expressive association may not insulate itself from antidiscrimination laws just by claiming that inclusion of an unwelcome
member would hamper its message. 243 The Court's warning implies
that some bottom line assessment of the record must be made by the
Court, otherwise all expressive association claims could readily be
tailored to state a prima facie case of infringement.2 44
Even if one were to take the Court's pronouncements at face value,
however, and to assume that Baden-Powell's litigation claims are
sufficient to show both that the school expresses disapproval of
homosexuality and that Doe's inclusion would unconstitutionally
abridge that expression, the inquiry does not end there. The Court
would still need to undertake the compelling state interest prong of
the inquiry.
C. Compelling State Interest
In the Baden-Powell hypothetical, there are two interests that the
state could claim to be compelling: the regulation of employment and
the overseeing of education. The Court has established the standards
to be applied.
The state's interest will not validate a "severe
intrusion" on the organization's free association right. 245 The Court
must determine whether the application of state anti-discrimination
law would present a "serious burden[] 2 46 or have a significant effect
on associational activities or compel organizations to "abandon their
basic goals. ' 247 A "slight infringement" of associational rights may be
justified by a state's compelling interests.248
241. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 149.
244. See supra note 147 (outlining the Dale dissenters' views on the majority's
deferential standard to an organization making a free association claim).
245. Supra note 152 and accompanying text.
246. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984).
247. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
248. Id. at 549.
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1. Employment
The Court's freedom of association cases have consistently tracked
the economic model of equal opportunity. In Runyon, the Court
supported its holding by equating opportunity to obtain an education
with employment opportunity. 249 The Roberts trilogy of cases
emphasized the importance of increasing access to benefits that
carried the promise of future economic advancement for historically
disadvantaged groups.254 Hurley and Dale, in contrast, were about
access to "civic space," that is, the full participation of homosexuals in
social and political discourse. 2 ' Although the latter may be the front
where gay rights activists choose to wage their battle in the culture
war, 25 2 it is apparent from the outcomes in Hurley and Dale that the
Court perceives a greater constitutional dilemma in sustaining this
discursive right against an expressive association claim than in
protecting the right to equal economic opportunity. This section
argues that where economic interests such as employment are at
stake, however, the Court has upheld a state's interest in ensuring
equal opportunity against an expressive organization's free association
claim.
That the federal government itself regards equal employment
opportunity in the field of education to be a compelling interest is
evident in Congress's inclusion of educational institutions and
educators within the purview of Title VII in 1972, repealing an initial
grant of exemption.253 Congress was well aware of the importance of
diversifying the teaching staff of educational institutions.254 The
House Committee on Education and Labor emphasized that women
and members of racial minorities had been denied opportunities to
undertake serious scholarship in positions of comparable
responsibility and prestige to those available to white males, and that
these opportunities should now be made accessible to them.255 The
government's compelling interest was to stem the unreflecting
transmission of stereotypes about these underrepresented groups,
which would perpetuate continuing discrimination.256
The Committee also highlighted the important role of educational
institutions in exposing the young to a variety of ideas that would
Congress thus considered
influence their later development.2 57
combating irrational prejudice to be crucial enough to overcome
249. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Part 1.C.2.
251. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.

252. See id.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See
See
See
See

supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, supra note 64, at 79-80.
id.
supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.

257. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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scruples about interfering with the prerogative of academic
institutions to decide "who may teach," long a treasured part of our
"tradition of academic freedom. 258 Although courts must take care
not to appropriate a role best undertaken by educators themselves in
judging the qualifications of their colleagues, 2 9 academic freedom
does not encompass the right to engage in discriminatory employment
practices.26 Courts have the duty of ensuring that legislative goals are
honored.26 '
Although Title VII does not protect individuals on the basis of
sexual orientation, states that treat sexual orientation as a protected
class have used it as a model in enacting their own employment
discrimination laws.26 2 Since Title VII only allows the enactment of
state laws which expand or are consistent with its provisions, 2"3 Title
V1I's framework and legislative history demonstrate co-extensive
parameters governing the permissible reach of state employment
discrimination laws.
Courts have staunchly upheld Title VII claims within the limits of
the legislative mandate. For example, lower courts in three cases
decided disputes involving private sectarian schools which had
dismissed unmarried pregnant employees-two were teachers and one
a librarian-claiming that they had violated the moral codes laid down
by the schools. 2 4 The courts ruled that if the employees' pregnancies
prompted their dismissal, that would be discrimination on the basis of
sex and prohibited by Title VII. 2 5 However, if the schools could
prove that they applied their moral codes equally in making
employment decisions regarding both male and female employees,
then they could rely on the exemption that Title VII allows to
258. Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 67 (2d. Cir. 1980) (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)). Senators Allen (Alabama) and Ervin (North
Carolina) brought an amendment to exclude religious and educational institutions
from Title V1I. See 118 Cong. Rec. 1977 (1972), reprinted in Legislative History of the
EEOA, supra note 64, at 881. In the Congressional debate over this amendment,
Senator Allen argued that the "overzealous proposal" to repeal the initial exemption
for educational institutions would "subvert academic freedom." 118 Cong. Rec. 1993
(1972) (statement of Sen. Allen), reprinted in Legislative History of the EEOA, supra
note 64, at 1254. He emphasized that the passage of the proposal would seriously
jeopardize "[olbjective criticism, independent judgment, [and] the search for truth
unhampered by transient political interests." Id. Nonetheless, the amendment was
defeated by fifty-five votes to twenty-five. See 118 Cong. Rec. 1995 (1972), reprinted
in Legislative History of the EEOA, supra note 64, at 1259.
259. See Kunda v. Muhlenberg Coll., 621 F.2d 532, 547-48 (3d Cir. 1980).
260. See Lieberman, 630 F.2d at 67.
261. See Kunda, 621 F.2d at 552.
262. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
264. Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Vigars
v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Dolter v. Wahlert
High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 267-68 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
265. Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 349; Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 806; Dolter, 483 F. Supp. at
270.
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religious institutions to discriminate on the basis of religion. 26' Two
courts pointed out, however, that because only women could ever be
fired for becoming pregnant outside of wedlock, there was a strong
inference that the dismissals involved sex discrimination.6 7
One school challenged Title VII on constitutional grounds, claiming
that it violated the First Amendment's Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. 26' The court held that Title VII violated neither.
Title VII had. a secular purpose and did not "promote or inhibit
religion"; its proscriptions were not targeted at either religious beliefs
or practices.269
Doe's case is analogous. Baden-Powell objects that Doe's openly
gay status offends its expressive position that homosexuality is
It claims constitutional protection under the First
.immoral.
In. Dale, an expressive
Amendment free association right.
organization's objection to homosexuality on moral grounds was
sufficient to justify the exclusion of a volunteer gay scoutmaster in
contravention of a state's public accommodations law, even though he
had made a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.2 "" In an employment context, however, given the Court's
past recognition that a state's interest in ensuring equal economic
opportunity is compelling, it is not self-evident that Dale should defeat
a homosexual employee's prima facie case of discrimination where the
state has made sexual orientation a protected class in its employment
discrimination law. Instead, the pregnancy cases decided under Title
VII indicate that Doe should have at least as strong a case as the
unmarried women plaintiffs.
Unlike the sectarian schools in the pregnancy cases, Baden-Powell
is a secular institution. Title VII does not exempt secular entities from
its proscriptions on the basis of moral beliefs. That limited carve-out
Even against Establishment
is only for religious organizations.27
school, however, the
religious
by
a
claims
Exercise
and
Free
clause
Court upheld Title VII's constitutionality.272 Free association is only a
derivative right compared to the Establishment and Free Exercise
prerogatives which are fundamental.273 Given that Title VII does not
violate the religion clauses, it is hard to see how a court could hold
266. Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 349; Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 806-07; Dolter, 483 F. Supp.
at 270 n.5. Title VII carves out a limited exception for religious institutions. Section
702 allows a religious organization to discriminate only with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion in the carrying on of any of its
activities, whether religious or secular. Title VII's other proscriptions against
discrimination still apply. See Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 806-07.
267. Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 344; Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 808.
268. Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 809.
269. Id. at 809-10.
270. See supra Part L.C.4.
271. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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that a state law modeled on Title VII would be unconstitutional as
applied to a secular school's derivative free association right.
The state's compelling interest in regulating employment provides
one strong argument against the expressive association right of a
private school to discriminate against homosexual teachers. The next
section contends that the state has a second compelling interest in the
regulation of education.
2. Education
The free association claim of a private school implicates a matrix of
closely intertwined competing interests: the school's right, as an
expressive association, to conduct its expressive activities free of state
intervention; the state's interest in regulating education, which
necessitates supervision of schools; the parents' intimate association
prerogative to direct the education of their children; and the children's
entitlement to exercise their First Amendment rights in the
educational process.
The Court's jurisprudence on schools has never declared any of
these rights to be paramount as a matter of law. In Meyer and Pierce
the Court affirmed that states may not ban the existence of private
schools, dictate what they shall teach, nor prevent parents from
sending their children to private schools. 274 The Court has also long
recognized that the state has an unquestionable interest in regulating
both private and public schools. 275 In Pierce, for example, the Court
stated that the state may "inspect, supervise, and examine [all
7
schools], their teachers and pupils. ''2
Thirty years later, in Brown v.
277
Board of Education, the Court declared that "education is perhaps
' 27
the most important function of state and local governments. 1
The question, then, is not whether, but the extent to which the state
may permissibly regulate private schools. The answer depends on two
inter-related issues: (1) what we deem to be the purpose of education,
and (2) who shall have the authority to decide between competing
conceptions of educational purpose. This section argues that liberal
education best prepares the young to be citizens in a democratic
society. It further contends that a conception of parental authority as
one of trusteeship rather than ownership is more consistent with this
model of education, and that the authority to make educational
decisions should be balanced between state and parent with reference
to the interests of the child. Applying these principles to the BadenPowell hypothetical, this section concludes that private schools should
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 493.

2003]

DALE AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS

2635

not be exempt from the application of state anti-discrimination laws.
This conclusion is further supported by the recognition that liberal
education plays an important role in fighting discrimination. It is also
supported by the fact that the Court's jurisprudence on schools
indicates that Baden-Powell, as a secular institution, is less entitled to
shield its discriminatory actions behind First Amendment mandates
than a sectarian school.
The Court has observed that in a democracy, education plays a vital
role in preparing the nation's youth for citizenship and civic
participation.27 9 The model of education that best serves this purpose
has been famously described by the Court thus:
The classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.... Teachers and students must always remain free to
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.s
Freedom to explore and examine ideas, then, is the touchstone of this
model of education, one informed by the values of liberalism. 2 1' This
theory of education requires the child to participate actively in the
discovery of truth through exploring and questioning a variety of
received ideas.25 2
The requirement of liberal theory that the child actively participate
in the educational process is inconsistent with the conception of
parental educational authority advocated by Gilles and other
supporters of Dale. Building on Gilles' argument that parents have a
First Amendment right to determine their children's education, Dale's
supporters have contended that parents exercise their free speech
rights by choosing schools and by speaking to their children through
the medium of schools and instructors.2 3 The free association
279. See id.; see also Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for
Citizenship, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 131, 131 (1995).
280. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
281. See Stanley Fish, Children and the First Amendment, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 883,
883-86 (1997) (outlining liberalism as the philosophical basis for the "marketplace of
ideas" model of American education, but pointing out the fundamental flaw that this
ideal "is itself an agenda informed by values that are themselves unexamined and
insulated from challenge"); cf. Gilles, supra note 8, at 946-51 (arguing that liberal
theories of education undermine parents' rightful authority to decide what values
their children should be taught).
282. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 155-60 (1980);
Brian Crittenden, Education and Social Ideals 71 (1973); Paolo Freire, Pedagogy of
the Oppressed 72, 79-81 (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., 30th anniversary ed. 2001);
Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 89-90 (1987); Patricia White, Beyond
Domination 109-10 (1983); Sherry, supra note 279. at 172-75.
283. See supra notes 182, 210-11 and accompanying text.
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privilege of schools to exclude messages and messengers follows from
parents' First Amendment right not to endorse messages with which
they disagree." 4 By framing the issue of educational decision-making
as a conflict between parents' First Amendment rights and state
coercion, however, the free speech justification for parental
educational authority propels the child into the middle of a discursive
tug-of-war between parents and the state, one in which the voice of
the child cannot be heard.2"5 Ironically, then, the free speech right of
parents accomplishes the silencing of the child."' Such a result
contradicts liberal education's conception of children as active
explorers of ideas, exercising their First Amendment rights in the
discovery of truth." 7
The concept of parents as having an ownership interest in their
children... is a disturbing aspect of the justification for parental
educational authority that tends to be overlooked when the issue is
framed as one of parents' free speech rights. Underlying the free
speech justification for parents' rights is a notion that parents are
entitled to shape their children into "conduit[s]" for the parents' own
expression by controlling what messages their children receive.8
Thus, while it is generally true, as Woodhouse and Dwyer note, that
the interests of parents and children are aligned, and that parents are
the child's best guardians, "constitutionalizing this presumption" as a
parental "right" is potentially oppressive.29 . Further, it would subvert
the goals and methods of liberal education by allowing parents to
regulate the marketplace of ideas to which their children are
exposed.29
The obvious alternative of permitting the state to regulate the
classroom is equally disturbing and unacceptable,2 "2 but it is not the
only alternative available. The idea proposed by Woodhouse and
Dwyer, that parents should be viewed as trustees of their children,
avoids the undesirable consequences of vesting educational authority
284. See supra notes 183, 214 and accompanying text.
285. In Gilles' articulation of his theory of parental educational authority, for
example, discussion of the child's interests is substantially overshadowed by
discussion of the competing rights of state and parents. See generally Gilles, supra
note 8.
286. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
287. That children have First Amendment rights, and that they do not leave them
behind "at the schoolhouse gate," is a well-established proposition in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969). The Court has upheld the First Amendment rights of school children to
protest the Vietnam War, see id. at 514, and to refuse to salute the flag. See W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
288. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
289. Supra note 217 and accompanying text.
290. Woodhouse, supra note 8, at 1115; see supra note 224 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
292. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506-07 (citing cases): Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
401-02 (1923).
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solely in either parent or state.29 3 If parents are viewed as holding the
child in trust for fully participatory membership in a democratic
society,2 4 then it is possible to conceive of educational authority as an
ongoing dialogue between parent, state, and the maturing child.
Dwyer has suggested that one way trusteeship would work is for
courts to employ a "substituted-judgment" procedure when
adjudicating conflicts between state and parent over the upbringing of
a child.293 Under this procedure, both state and parent would argue
their case with reference to what a child would likely choose for
himself or herself, were he or she capable of doing SO.296 By making
the safeguarding of the child's future right to choose the guiding
interest in educational decision-making, the trusteeship concept is
faithful to the democratic ideal of individual self-determination.29 7
Under the trusteeship model of parental responsibility, the vitality of
liberal education's marketplace of ideas would be preserved as an
essential training ground for the child's exercise of choice.295
Applying the trusteeship concept of parenthood to the hypothetical
case of Baden-Powell v. Doe, there is a strong argument that the
state's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination should prevail
over Baden-Powell's expressive association and parents' intimate
association rights to exclude the "idea" expressed by an openly gay
teacher. When parents are viewed as trustees rather than as owners,
the child's right to receive ideas and explore them in the classroom
marketplace overrides the right of parent or state to exclude those
ideas, because it is reasonable to believe that children would prefer to
receive an education that promotes their interest in exercising
autonomous judgment and choice as they develop into independent
adults. 299 It is through "exposure to [the] robust exchange of ideas ' "'
that the child prepares to exercise such choice.
Lending support to this argument is Congress's recognition that
schools play a crucial role in combating discrimination, expressed in
the report of the House Committee on Education and Labor in
connection with the 1972 repeal of Title VII's exemption for
educational institutions and educators.3 "" The ideas to which youth
are exposed in the classroom strongly influence their development;

293. See supra notes 218-19, 222-25 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
295. Dwyer, supra note 215, at 1430-31.
296. See id. at 1430. For an argument that elevating children's interests over
parents' rights will not result in greater state intrusion into the family, see id. at 1438
(contending that it is in the child's interest to ensure that parents are happy in the
parenting role).
297. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
299. See Dwyer, supra note 215, at 1434.
300. Supra note 280 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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allowing discrimination there would, "more than in any other area,"
perpetuate stereotypes and discriminatory behavior.312
The recognition that liberal education plays a crucial role in fighting
discrimination strongly informed the Court's decisions in Brown and
Runyon. Prejudice, the refusal to examine received ideas, is precisely
the kind of unreflective attitude this model of education aims to
challenge.
The Brown court declared that desegregation was key to
34
eliminating the inferior status of blacks in the community. 0
Underlying that idea was the recognition that the interaction of the
races would provoke reassessment of previously held misconceptions.
The Runyon court reasoned that the admission of black students
would not hinder the schools from teaching the desirability of
segregation,3 °5 but that was not a wholly honest conclusion. In the
wake of Brown, the Court must have understood that a racially
integrated environment would subvert the successful transmission of
the schools' message. °6 Thus, the Court's formalistic argument that
the schools were free to propound their message of segregation co37
existed with a realization that the freedom was an empty one. 0
Implicitly, the Court decided that the state's interest in regulating
education superseded the private schools' rights of expressive
association.
Liberal educational theory also undercuts Carpenter's argument,
discussed in Part II, that Runyon is distinguishable from a case such as
Doe where the school wishes to exclude a teacher rather than a
student.'" Carpenter contends that a teacher who expresses values
opposed to those of the school would subvert the school's expression,
but a dissenting student poses no threat to the school's ability to carry
out its expressive agenda.' 9 This analysis rests on a false distinction
between teacher-senders and student-recipients. The liberal theory of
education contradicts the idea of communication as going one way in
the classroom, from teacher to student. 3t ( The classroom that
represents a marketplace of ideas operates through the bartering of
ideas from which truth will be discovered.?
302. Supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
303. See Freire, supra note 282, at 72-74. Freire discusses the dynamics of
"banking" as opposed to the humanist concept of education in the context of adult
literacy programs in the Third World. See Richard Shaull, Foreword to Freire, supra

note 282, at 29.
304. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954).

305. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
306. See Hirschoff, supra note 82, at 751.
307. See id.

308. See supra Part I1.A.
309. See supra notes 193-95, 198 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 282.
311. See Freire, supra note 282, at 77. The above discussion of the teacher-student
dynamic in a liberal education system is based on normative premises, not necessarily
actual practice. As one commentator has pointed out, a "respected and progressive"
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Experience demonstrates that the expression of students may be
perceived as impinging on the message of the school, while the
expression of teachers may not. For example, in Gay Rights Coalition
of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University,1 2 a
private Catholic university refused to give two gay and lesbian student
organizations official recognition because it did not wish to be
perceived as approving the positions taken by the organizations on a
variety of issues.313 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
held that free speech and free exercise, guaranteed by the First
Amendment, prohibited the state from compelling the university to
endorse views repugnant to its own beliefs." 4 In contrast, in Shelton v.
Tucker,31' the Supreme Court held that most associational affiliations
of teachers outside the school had no bearing on their fitness to
teach," 6 despite the fact that a teacher's role in "shap[ing] the attitude
of young minds" makes the classroom a particularly "sensitive"
place.317
One way, then, to understand the different outcomes in Runyon
and Dale is the special value the Court has placed on the role of
liberal education in our society. Simply stated, Runyon involved the
state's interest in liberal education and Dale did not. The state has a
compelling interest in its schools, both public and private, to prepare
young citizens for civic participation.3"' The Boy Scouts also instills
values in the young, but the state has a lesser interest in regulating its
activity because it does not rely on the Boy Scouts to prepare the
young for citizenship. School attendance is compulsory; participation
in the Boy Scouts is not. The work of schools lies at the core of a
state's interest in education; the activity of the Boy Scouts is
peripheral.
The fact that the hypothetical Baden-Powell is a secular school
further supports the argument that state anti-discrimination laws
should prevail over the school's right of free association. The Court
school system may in fact promote "conformity, anti-intellectualism, passivity,
alienation, classism, and hierarchy." Sherry, supra note 279, at 173 (quoting Stephen
Arons, Compelling Belief: The Culture of American Schooling 78 (1983)).
312. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
313. See id. at 11-12.
314. See id. at 25. The court also ruled, however, that the Free Exercise Clause did
not immunize the university from compliance with the state's anti-discrimination
statute with regard to the provision of tangible benefits to the gay and lesbian
organizations. Here, the burden imposed on the university's free religious exercise
was outweighed by the District of Columbia's compelling interest in fighting sexual
orientation discrimination. Hence, the university was obligated to make its facilities
and services available to the gay and lesbian organizations on the same basis as to
student organizations whose views it did approve. See id. at 39.
315. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
316. See id. at 488.
317. Id. at 485.
318. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
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has consistently distinguished between secular and sectarian claims for
constitutional exemption from state regulation of education."' In
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court stated that "[a] way of life, however
virtuous and admirable,- may not be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular
considerations."32 Where, however, parental interests in directing
children's religious education are reinforced by a free exercise claim,
the state's interest must give way before the free exercise prerogative
of the First Amendment.' 2 This distinction acknowledges that the
liberal model of education, inclusive as it strives to be, is necessarily
opposed to the religious model, which liberal theorists portray as
valuing orthodoxy and discouraging the questioning of revealed
truths. 2 The difference between humanistic and religious ideals of
education, then, is not "between a closed environment and an open
'
one, but between environments that are differently closed."323
Thus,
the Court honors the religion clauses of the First Amendment by
creating exemptions from certain state regulations when religious
convictions are opposed to state doctrine. These narrow exemptions
for religious exercise imply, however, that the expressive association
claim of a private school grounded in purely secular principles-for
example, a belief that homosexuality is illegitimate-is entitled to less
weight in the compelling state interests balancing test than an
identical claim grounded in deeply held religious convictions. 24

319. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 233 (1972).
320. Id. at 215.
321. See id. at 233. The Court has emphasized that this is a very limited exemption
from generally applicable state regulations that are not directed at religious practices
but may have an incidental effect on them. Unless a free exercise claim is connected
with expression or parental rights, the First Amendment does not shield individuals
from having to obey such laws. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872. 878-82
(1990) (citing cases): cf. Dwyer, supra note 215, at 1378 (observing that judicial
treatment of constitutional rights where parental interests are concerned departs from
well-settled principles of constitutional and common law).
322. See Fish, supra note 281, at 885; see also Sherry, supra note 279, at 174 (stating
that "[t]hose who believe that truth lies in faith... find an education in critical
thought offensive to their basic belief systems").
323. See Fish, supra note 281, at 886.
324. The Court explained, however, that the combination of free association and
free exercise rights may be limited "if it appears that parental decisions will
jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social
burdens." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234. The Court referred to its decision in Prince v.
Massachusetts, where the due process right of a nine-year old child's guardian, and the
free exercise right of the child, to have the child sell Jehovah's Witnesses magazines
on the street, were subject to the state child labor law. See 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The
Yoder Court took care to emphasize that courts must proceed carefully when
"weighing a State's legitimate social concern [against] religious claims for exemption
from generally applicable education requirements." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. Even
when a free exercise claim reinforces a free association claim, therefore, parents'
rights may be superseded by a state's compelling interests.
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Dale supporters have argued that the Court's decision reinforces
the case for parental educational authority because parents "speak" to
their children through the expressive association of the school. The
paradigm of combative speakers set up in Dale,3 25 however, drowns
out the child's voice. Yet, it is the child who has the most at stake in
the educational process.326 The concept of parents as trustees, which
focuses on the child's interests rather than those of the parents and
the state, would yield a more fruitful, and more just, consideration of
' in our schools.
who gets to "create and contest social meaning" 327
CONCLUSION

The Dale dissenters remind us that states are laboratories of
economic and social change.328
State and local laws laid the
groundwork for the enactment of federal statutes in successive civil
rights movements, first to secure equal opportunity for racial
minorities, then to gain access to social and economic advancement
for women. 9
The gay rights movement wishes to expand the market model of
civil rights legislation, seeking full participation for homosexuals in
the social and political life of the nation.33 States are again leading
the way in this latest civil rights movement, and it is clear that the
battleground will move from public commercial space to private nonprofit spheres.
Future litigation involving the expressive association rights of
private schools will lead us to examine a question of vital concern for
our society: Who will have a say in the shaping of tomorrow's citizens?
This Note proposes that the state can raise two arguments to counter
a private school's claim of a free association right to discriminate
against homosexual teachers. First, the state has a compelling interest
in ensuring equal employment opportunity, one that the Supreme
Court has affirmed by upholding anti-discrimination laws against
expressive association claims where economic interests have been at
stake. Second, the state has an interest in educating the young for
citizenship and civic participation, in particular by promoting access to
325. See supra Part I.C.4.
326. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 243-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing
that the Court should hear the views of the child where the views of the parent are the
subject of a suit because "[i]t
is the future of the student, not the future of the parents,
that is imperiled by [the Court's] decision").
327. Supra note 162 and accompanying text.
328. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 664 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
329. See Hunter, supra note 18, at 1617-24 (outlining the history of the civil rights
movements); see also Legislative History of Titles VII and XI, supra note 24, at 5
(noting that even before the Civil Rights Act was adopted in 1964, more than half the
states had enacted equal employment opportunity legislation).
330. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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the classroom, which represents the marketplace of ideas. The state's
compelling interests in employment and education should prevail over
the private school's freedom to exclude.

